Experience with historical monetary unions by Krämer, Hans R.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Krämer, Hans R.
Working Paper
Experience with historical monetary
unions
Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 5
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Krämer, Hans R. (1970) : Experience with historical monetary unions, Kieler
Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 5, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48044KIELER DISKUSSIONSBEITRAGE
zu aktuellen wirtschaftspolitischen Fragen
Experience With Historical Monetary Unions
By Hans R.jKrdmer
0 Monetary unions of the past had a better chance of success if economic policies of the
participating states were in harmony. Example: The Scandinavian Monetary Union in contrast
to the Latin Monetary Union.
0 Since harmony of economic policies could not be maintained under political stress (in the First
World War), even the Scandinavian Union failed. .1
0 The only cases where monetary unions have survived up toQiow are those of general political,
economic, and monetary unification: Switzerland, Italy and Germany. In monetary matters, the
centralizing of decisions has been a minimum requirement for the success of a union.
0 No historical monetary union has brought about political unification. It has always been the
other way round.
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Experience With Historical Monetary Unions
1. Monetary union among the members of the European Economic Community is at pre-
sent one of the important and controversial topics in the discussion about economic
integration. The merits, the dangers, and the consequences of such a union have
already been looked at from some different angles. It is, however, surprising to
observe that one of the most traditional approaches to study the problems involved
has been neglected so far. I think of the historical approach. There have been mone-
tary unions in the past. Why shouldn't one try to find out whether some lesson can
be drawn from this past experience?
2. The term "monetary union" will be used here rather loosely. A modern definition
would be of little use when applied to the old cases. But this excuse may even be un-
necessary since there is no such thing as a generally accepted definition of a mone-
tary union. A definition made up solely for our purpose here would not be helpful,
either. This will become obvious when the cases to be treated under the heading of
monetary union are named: the Latin monetary union, the Scandinavian monetary
union, the German-Austrian monetary union, the Swiss monetary union, the Italian
monetary union, the German monetary union.
Not only do the degrees of "cooperation" applied in these "unions" differ considerably,
one may even doubt whether the monetary arrangements which accompanied the nation-
al unifications of Switzerland, Germany, and Italy should be named "monetary unions"
at all. But if one hesitates to do so, one would exclude just those cases which are
most similar to the present European project: economic and political integration
accompanied or followed by monetary unification.
Under these circumstances it seems appropriate to make no attempt to define the
"monetary union", and to simply start discussing one of the historical cases.
3. The Latin Monetary Union is the loosest of the arrangements to be regarded and,
geographically, the most extensive. It was founded in 1865 by France, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Italy. Greece joined in 1868.
4. The formation of the Latin Monetary Union amounted, partly, to an institutionalization
of already existing facts: When Belgium became politically independent in 1831, it
adopted the monetary system of France.
1 The Belgian coins - "francs" like the French
ones - were of the same fineness and of the same "Value as those of France. The
French coins were made legal tender in Belgium.
In Switzerland the Bundesverfassung of 1848 brought the previously existing confusion
of cantonally issued money to an end.
2 As in Belgium, the French monetary system
was adopted, the Swiss franc corresponding exactly to the French franc. French
silver coins were granted legal status. Although the law
3 concerned only silver coins,
the French gold pieces circulated in Switzerland, as well.
1 Cf. H.P. WILLIS, A History of the Latin Monetary Union. Chicago 1901, reprinted
New York 1968, p. 15.
2 Cf. H.P. WILLIS, op. cit., p. 26.
3 Of May 7, 1850.Italy,, after its unification, introduced a coinage system similar to that of France,
1
the lira taking the place of the franc.
2 Moreover, the French coins were to circulate
legally in Italy as they did in Belgium and in Switzerland.
Not only did the French coins circulate in the three other countries. The same was
true for Belgian coins in France, Switzerland, and Italy as well as for Swiss and
Italian coins in the remaining three countries. There was, however, one difficulty
regarding subsidiary coin, i.e. pieces of less than five francs in value. These were
of different fineness in the four states: Swiss coins were . 800 fine, Italian ones . 835
fine, while Belgian coins had a fineness of . 900, and in France some were . 835 and
others .900 fine.
5. These differences were one of the subjects of the treaty establishing a monetary
union between the four countries.
3 It stipulated that coins of 2 francs, 1 franc, 50
centimes and .20 centimes should have a fineness of . 835.
 4 As for the other coins,
the parties agreed on a fineness of .900 for gold pieces of 100, 50, 20, 10 and 5
francs
5 and for silver 5-franc pieces.
6
6. Since, at a fineness of . 835, the nominal value of the small coins was greater than
their real value, a country issuing great quantities of such coins might have been
able to make some gains, if these coins circulated in the whole union. The amount
each state was allowed to mint was, therefore, limited to the equivalent of six
francs per capita.
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7. That precaution taken, the treaty could stipulate that the coins issued by each of the
contracting parties were reciprocally received in their public treasuries.
8 This
meant, in practics, that they could freely circulate in the four countries, for nobody
had any reason to refuse a coin issued in one of the other states.
8. One precaution was not taken, however, and this was felt almost immediately. The
treaty did not regulate the relation of gold to silver. True, since gold pieces as
well as silver pieces were defined in fineness, weight, and measure, a ratio be-
tween the two metals was determined. This ratio was 15 1/2 : 1. This would have
sufficed only if the respective values of gold and silver had remained constant,
which they did not. First, owing to the new discovery of gold in California and else-
where, the value of gold respective to silver diminished. Later on, the value of gold
recovered and even commanded a considerable premium over silver.
As the coinage of pieces of 5 francs and more was free, it was to be expected that
the coins of the relatively dearer metal would disappear and be replaced by those of
the cheaper metal. This working of Gresham
1 s law was, of course, no speciality of
the monetary union. A new feature was, however, that the member states were in a
position to enrich themselves at the expense of the other partners of the union. If they
1 By the law of August 24, 1862.
2 Cf. H.P. WILLIS, op. cit., p. 36.
3 Treaty of December 23, 1865. Reprinted in H. P. WILLIS, op. cit., Appendix I.
4 Art. 4 of the treaty.
5 Art. 2 of the treaty.
6 Art. 3 of the treaty.
7 ' Art. 9 of the treaty.
8 Art. 2 for gold pieces, Art. 3 for 5-franc silver pieces, Art. 7 for small coins
(2, 1, 0. 50, 0. 20 francs) .issued low value coins it was highly probable that a good deal of these coins found
their way to the partner states.
9. Although it cannot be said that one or the other of the members of the union acted
deliberately in this way, France found herself burdened with great quantities of low
value silver 5-franc pieces. So, finally, the coinage of these pieces was "provi-
sionally" suspended.
1 Moreover, the parties agreed that at the expiration of the
treaty the silver 5-franc pieces should be reimbursed by the country which had
issued them.
 2
10. With these steps, the Latin Union practically adopted the gold standard. This had
been advocated by the smaller countries from the beginning.
3 France had, how-
ever, succeeded in preserving her system, which duly caused some crises in the
Union. After the revision of 1885, the obstacles connected with bi-metallism were
removed, so that the Union could concentrate on difficulties of another character.
Such difficulties existed, as will be seen later. The big crisis came when, at the
beginning of the First World War in 1914, the circulation of gold, and with it the
functions of the Union, were suspended. The attempts, after the war, to revive it
4
met with little success. So it was dissolved formally in 1926.
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11. From the history of the Latin Monetary Union one lesson can be learnt which is
by no means new: Given a bi-metallic standard, Gresham
1 s law operates. Old as
this observation may be, it is of value even today in connection with the projects
of a EEC monetary union. Of course, no gold or silver will circulate inside the
Community. There have been plans, however, to issue an EEC-currency which is
to circulate simultaneously with the national currencies of the member states.
If there are fixed exchange rates between the EEC-currency and the franc, guilder,
D-Mark and lira, then there will be another opportunity for Gresham
1 s law to be
tested. The EEC-currency is "good" money in - say - Italy, if the lira depreciates
vis-a-vis the other currencies of the Community. Italians using EEC-currency will
get more for their money abroad than those who use lire. So, everybody will use
EEC-currency for payments abroad while goods and services bought in Italy will be
paid for in lire. The "good" EEC-money will be "driven out".
In another member state - say Germany - EEC-currency becomes "bad" money if
the value of the D-Mark vis-a-vis the currencies of the member states rises above
the respective value of the EEC-currency. Then payments abroad will be made in
D-Mark while German goods and services are paid for in EEC-currency. So, at
least a tendency of "bad" EEC-currency driving out "good" D-Mark will be noticed.
12. Apart from the experiment in bi-metallism, the different fineness of the silver
coins in the partner states of the Latin Monetary Union could have given rise to
some operations of Gresham
1 s law. It will be remembered, however, that the Union
treaty stipulated a unique fineness of . 835 to be used in future issues.
It was never taken up again. Art. 9 of the traty of 1878. Reprinted in H. P. WILLIS,
op. cit., Appendix I.
2 Art. 14 of the treaty of 1885. Reprinted in H. P. WILLIS, op. cit., Appendix I.
3 As to the arguments see H.P. WILLIS, op. cit., p. 42 et seq.
4 Cf. L.-A. DUBOIS, La fin de I
1 Union Monetaire Latine, Arbois 1950, p. 45 et seq.
5 The Swiss government sent a note to the member states declaring that it considered
the Union dissolved as per December 31, 1926. L.-A. DUBOIS, op. cit., p. 73.13. Another rule regarding the small silver coins issued by the Union members may be
of more interest in EEC-times: It is article 9 of the treaty which limited the issue
of these coins to the equivalent of six franc per capita. This regulation is of special
importance since it dealt with coins the silver value of which was less than the nomi-
nal value.
The reason for the limitation was given above: It was feared that partner states
issuing great quantities of such coins would make some profit at the expense of
other Union members. Since the treasury
1 s gains from coinage are approximately
equivalent to the difference between nominal and metal value of a coin, the overall
profit of the mint rises with the amount and the nominal value of the coins issued.
Since the amount of coins which can be circulated in the national economy is limited
by the paying habits of the public, the mint can make additional profits only if under-
. valued coins are circulated elsewhere, i.e. in the other member states of the Union.
These, of course, would like to do the profitable minting business themselves.
Hence the necessity to reserve a share for all partners. This was done by article 9.
In addition, article 8 of the treaty stipulated that each participating state was obliged
to receive from individuals or public treasuries of the other states the small silver
coins it had issued and to exchange them against fully valued gold (or silver 5-franc)
pieces.
14. Obviously, the rules concerning subsidiary coins as such are of little more than
historical interest at present. The problem which these coins of low metal value pos-
ed is, however, essentially the same as that posed by banknotes which have not even
a metal value: If, within a monetary union, the authorities of the member states are
allowed to issue national money, which, if any, rules must be introduced to regulate
this issue?
15. The treaty establishing the Latin Monetary Union did not stipulate that the coins
issued by a member state were legal tender in the remaining countries. Since it o-
bliged the treasuries of all participating countries to accept these coins, free circula-
tion was, nevertheless, practically assured. This situation may appear similar to
that existing in a modern system of free convertibility. In such a system convertible
banknotes issued in other countries are accepted by the national authorities (the re-
serve bank) and exchanged against national currency.
Although this condition is given in the European Economic Community ( and in the
whole area of convertibility) little circulation of currency can be observed outside
the national boundaries. This may be due to the fact that the present system in-
volves the risk of exchange rate variations. In the Latin Monetary Union no such risk
existed.
1 A coin of 1 Belgian franc circulating in Switzerland was worth exactly
1 Swiss franc, and sure to remain so.
Apart from giving security against exchange rate variations this relation 1 Belgian
franc = 1 Swiss franc = 1 French franc = 1 lira = 1 drachme was extremely con-
venient. No calculations were necessary to find out the value of a foreign coin in
national currency. There can be no doubt that this convenience facilitated the cir-
This means that the official exchange rate between the circulating coins was not al-
tered. It will be seen later that in the market the exchange rates between the cur-
rencies of the Union varied considerably.culation of coins inside the whole Union very much. And probably this fact is play-
ing a role in the modern plans for a single European currency.
16. Another question is-, whether the precautions taken by the founders of the Latin
•Union against excessive minting of low value coins are worth considering today. As
said, subsidiary coins are not the problem. But at present the value of coins and
banknotes of all sorts is almost totally only nominal, the metal or paper value being
negligible. So, if one thinks in terms of minting profit - as was the case regarding
the small coins in the Latin Monetary Union - minting and printing money offers
great profit for the treasury. A policy making excessive use of this opportunity is
nowadays by no means unknown, although the reasons given for such easy money
policy are a bit more sophisticated than was the purpose of which the governments
were suspected in the treaty establishing the Latin Monetary Union.
17. Easy money policy pursued by a member state within a monetary union of modern
kind can spread the danger of inflation to the partner countries. This point needs no
elaboration: If there is one source of easy money in a monetary union, this one
source can suffice to float the whole union with money, even if none is supplied by
the authorities of the other member states. This is unconditionally true in a union
with a single currency. If different currencies exist, the process will be complicat-
ed by the balance of payments problem, but the tendency remains the same.
18. So, clearly, it will be very useful to protect the participating countries against
excessive use of the printing press by one or more of the other member states. In
a union with a single currency, this would even be true if everybody were fond of
an inflation. No monetary union is conceivable in which all parties are glad to see
one partner taking away all gains to be had from an inflationary policy, while the
disadvantages are "socialized".
19. The Latin Monetary Union envisaged two forms of protection against such a policy.
These were, redemption of the money floated in the partner countries and a system
limiting the issue of money.
The gold standard
1 offered a simple method of redemption within the Lation Union,
i.e. payment in gold. Moreover, the amount of money which could fall under the
redemption clause was relatively small: Coins of 5 franc or less. In a modern
European Monetary Union this amount could be far greater, the technical possibili-
ties of the printing press to produce banknotes of every nominal value being prac-
tically unlimited. Nevertheless, redemption is possible.
20. Redemption could be organized according to the old "Latin" method: EEC-currency
banknotes or coins issued in member state A and circulated in another member state
B may be offered by the authorities of B to those of A. A, having issued these
banknotes or coins, must exchange them against gold of an equal value. B should,
of course, thake back money it had issued. Possibly it could be arranged that other
currencies - such as US dollar - could be given instead of gold, as well.
The procedure might be refined by using a clearing method, so that the system
could work rather smoothly. This way, without to much interference with the free
For the purpose of this discussion the standard employed in the Latin Monetary Union
can be regarded as a gold standard in spite of the (controlled) circulation of silver
5-franc pieces.circulation of all EEC-currency, some check to excessive issuing of money can be
built in.
21. A far simpler check would be "Latin" method no. 2: The high contracting parties
shall issue money only to an amount equivalent to either a given amount per capita
or some percentage of the GNP, etc.
1 Probably, the percentage criterion would be
better suited since it lets room for an expansion of the amount of money in relation
to the growth of the GNP. Better still might be a method by which not the whole
amount of money but only newly issued money were limited to a percentage of the
growth of the GNP.
22. One further lesson to be drawn from the history of the Latin Monetary Union has to
do with the so-called cours force of national currencies. This practice is probably
the main reason for the agony of the Latin Union, but it had already caused con-
siderable difficulties in its earlier years.
The first case in point was the cours force of the lira in 1866. It was the result of
a chronic deficit in the Italian budget and a large surplus of imports over exports.
2
The circulation of paper money was increased until it reached an amount far in
excess of the specie. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the pa-
per money could no longer be redeemed in gold at the official rate. Therefore,
when with the declaration of hostilities between Italy and Austria in April 1966 the
finance minister was granted extraordinary powers, these powers were used at
once to make the notes irredeemable, although their "course" remained, by legal
"force", the same.
23. What happened on account of the cours force was to be expected. The coins left
Italy in direction of the partner states of the Union. That they immediately disap-
peared from circulation inside the Peninsula had nothing to do with the existence
of the Latin Union. The reason was that the coins kept their metal value while the
value of the national currency depreciated. Only the second part of the story was
partly due to the fact that Italy was partner of a monetary union. The full value
pieces of 5 francs and more could have been exported to every country where gold
and silver could be presented for minting. But it should be remembered, that in-
side the Union the pieces were accepted without re-minting at their face value.
This was of special importance as far as the small coins of low metal value were
concerned. They retained their full nominal value in every country of the union, in
spite of the fact that the market value of one lira was considerably less than that
of one franc.
24. The flooding of the other countries of the Union with Italian coins caused, of course,
a redundancy of subsidiary money in these states while in Italy the amount of small
coins became smaller than necessary for normal transactions. Since the treaty o-
bliged Italy to redeem the coins it had issued, the situation seems to have caused
most difficulties in Italy herself: shortage of small coins and the obligation to re-
deem the coins exported in gold, i.e. at a price much higher than the exchange value
of the lira. But the other member states had at least to give forced credit to the Ita-
lian government in the amount ot the circulating Italian coin.
Text adopted from Art. 9 of the treaty establishing the Latin Monetary Union, where
the amount in question is six francs per capita.
For details see H. P. WILLIS, op. cit. , p. 61 et seq.25. The experience with the cours force was repeated several times during the history
of the Latin Union. Until the First World War it concerned especially Italy and
Greece, where the actual exchange rate of the (paper) currency was continually
lower than the parity of the coins. Starting with the war the currencies of all part-
ners depreciated against the Swiss franc. Redemption of paper money in gold ceased
everywhere. In 1921 the French franc had lost 64 % against the Swiss franc, the
Belgian franc had lost 65 %, the lira 78 % and the drachme still more.
1
It was, therefore, not surprising that the coins - exchanged still at nominal parity
- were the object of considerable speculation, and the circulation of all coins within
the whole Union became an absurd onesided affair. One might think that the only
reasonable thing would have been to stop the exchange of coins officially. But this
would have amounted to a dissolution of the Union, the intercirculation being the
main reason for its existence. So, when finally in 1926 the small coins were nation-
alized, the Latin Union was dissolved.
26. Why the Latin Monetary Union lived for so long in spite of its disadvantages seems
to be due to a mixture of economic and political reasons. One reason for the lon-
gevity of the Union was that its dissolution would have been rather costly
2 because,
according to the convention of 1885, it necessitated the redemption of the silver
5-franc pieces in gold, by the states having issued these pieces. This would have
meant losses to the treasuries of those states, since the market rate of silver res-
pective to gold had deteriorated considerably, while the official rate remained at
15 1/2 : 1.
Another reason of more or less a political kind must be mentioned. France was the
predominant power in the Union economically and politically. Paris was a financial
center. This position was strengthened by the Union so that France could not be in-
terested in its dissolution. Neither were most of her partners who enjoyed some
protection by France and were unwilling to antagonize her
3 .
That the intercirculation of coins facilitated the transactions between the member
countries of the Union must have become less important since the foundation of the
Union, owing to the development of the habits of payment. Cheques, bills of exchange,
money orders took the place of coins as medium of payment, if ever these were
employed to a large extent in international transactions.
27. For transactions in banknotes and through banks the market exchange rate between
the different currencies prevailed - not the metal parity. There is, however, an-
other experiment in monetary union where transactions in banknotes took place at
parity, too. It is the Scandinavian Monetary Union.
As in the case of the Latin Union, the money of each of the three Scandinavian states
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway circulated in the whole of Scandinavia even be-
fore the monetary union was established in 1873
4. So, the Scandinavian Monetary
Union institutionalized insofar the existing practice as did the Latin Union.
1 Cf. L. -A. DUBOIS, op. cit. , p. 62.
2 Cf. L.-A. DUBOIS, op. cit., p. 18.
3 Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, Les conventions monetaires, Paris et Bruxelles 1911, p. 382;
L.-A. DUBOIS, op. cit., p. 19.
4 In 1873 a convention was concluded between Sweden and Denmark. Norway joined in
1875. Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 110 et seq. French text of the convention,
ibid., p. 506 et seq.28. To a large extent the Scandinavian Union was a copy of the Latin Union, at least as
far as the text of the convention goes. The common unity of account was the crown,
consisting of 100 ore, and defined in weight, measure and fineness.
1 Coins minted
in one of the contracting states were legal tender in the other countries.
In contrast to the Latin Union no limitation of the issue of low value small coin was
stipulated. The parties found it impossible to fix the appropriate amount in advance.
2
They saw, however, that one state could issue excessive sums of subsidiary coins at
the expense of the partners. To exclude this possibility the authors of the convention
accepted the method of redemption, as did those of the Latin Union. According to
article 11 of the convention, each contracting party had to exchange, upon request,
the small coin it had issued against fully valued pieces.
29. The most remarkable feature of the Scandinavian Union as contrasted with the Latin
Union was that not only coins intercirculated between the different states but that
banknotes were accepted at par, as well. This was not stipulated in the convention
but, in fact, the circulation of banknotes was far greater than that of coins.
3 More-
over, a regular procedure was developed by which the banknotes were returned from
time to time to their country of origin by way of the respective central banks.
4
In addition, the central banks of the three Scandinavian countries concluded a con-
vention of close cooperation. Each of the banks established an account for each of
the others. Cheques could be drawn on these accounts, a credit balance bearing no
interest.
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30.. Up to the First World War the Scandinavian Union was a success. Having adopted
the gold standard from the start, it avoided the troubles caused by bi-metallism in-
side the Latin Union. Coins and banknotes were redeemed without difficulties. No
member country had to resort to a forced course, a practice which threatened to
ruin the Latin Union.
Naturally, a forced course in one of the Scandinavian countries would have been quite
incompatible with the circulation of banknotes within the whole Union. The same
would have been true, if the market exchange rate between the Scandinavian curren-
cies had differed from the official parity. A depreciated currency could, under such
circumstances, always have been transferred to one of the partner countries with
a gain.
That the Scandinavian Union depended on the fixed parity between the Nordic cur-
rencies became obvious during the First World War when the redemption of bank-
notes in gold was given up and the exchange rates deviated from one another.
6 With-
out the foundation on gold standard and fixed parity between the Scandinavian cur-
rencies the Union came to an end.
31. Both the story of the Latin Union and that of the Scandinavian Union show that mone-
tary unions of sovereign states depend at least on one thing: the official exchange
1 Art. 3 of the convention for pieces of 10 and 20 crowns, Art. 5 for smaller coins.
2 Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 121.
3 Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 132 et seq.
4 Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 134.
5 For details see A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 137 et seq.
6 Cf. L.-A. DUBOIS, op. cit., p. 97; O. VEIT, GrundriG der Wahrungspolitik. 3. Aufl.
Frankfurt 1969, p. 710.rates at which the respective currencies circulate in the different countries of the
union must not deviate from the market exchange rates.
This may seem to be an unnecessarily general statement because in the monetary
unions regarded so far the exchange rates were parity. But parity is no necessity.
In the Austro-German Monetary Union, for instance, another exchange rate prevail-
ed. The exchange rate laid down in the German (Dresdner) Monetary Convention
between the (northern) thaler and the (southern) guilder was 14 : 24 1/2.
2
32. Not parity but coincidence between the official and the market exchange rates has
proved necessary for the functioning of a monetary union. If there is a difference,
a premium will be paid for the depreciating currency in the partner states of the
union, as long as intercirculation is assured. Such a thing happened when Italy and
Greece adopted a forced course for their paper money. It happened further when the
exchange rates of the other countries of the Latin Union began to differ considerably
during and after the First World War.
Differences between the established exchange rate and that prevailing in the market
destroyed the Scandinavian Union, too, although it had, for long years, functioned
without trouble, including the intercirculation of paper money.
33. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Scandinavian Union did, as long as it last-
ed, much better than its Latin equivalent. The reason is that both unions were
equivalent only superficially. They tried to regulate the intercirculation of coins at
parity. That the Latin Union stipulated a limit to the issue of subsidiary coins while
the Scandinavian Union did not, cannot be regarded as essential, since the Latin
limit was changed several times. Further, redemption of small coin in gold was
stipulated in both treaties, and seems to have been precaution enough against
excessive minting of subsidiary money.
34. Nordic and Latin Monetary Union were not at all equivalent in economic homogenity.
Belgium/France/Switzerland and their Mediterranean partners differed consider-
ably with regard to economic development and stability. Hence the growing differen-
tiation of exchange rates and the cours force. In Scandinavia economic conditions
and economic policy were practically the same in all three countries. Therefore,
it was possible to proceed to intercirculation not only of coins but equally of bank-
notes and cheques. The end of the union came, when this condition was no longer
given, when the different countries adopted different economic policies.
Since our purpose is to draw lessons from the older experiences, we should trans-
late these conclusions into EEC language: Historical experience with monetary unions
shows that little trouble is to be expected if the homogenity with regard to eco-
nomic development and to economic policy is great, and no (exogenous) disturbances
(like the First World War) occur. Simpler: Harmonizing of economic policy is a
prerequisite to the success of a monetary union.
35. Since even under ideal conditions (exogenous) disturbances occur now and then
whereby the harmony of economic policy tends to get lost, history seems not to
1 Cf. A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 46; O. VEIT, op. cit., p. 462.
2 Cf. O. VEIT, op. cit., p. 459; W. O. HENDERSON, The Zollverein. London 1959,
p. 139.10
encourage the foundation of monetary unions. We can notice, however, that while
the Latin, the Scandinavian and the Austro-German
1 monetary unions failed, there
have been others which have succeeded - as can be seen from the list at the first
page of this essay: The Swiss and the Italian monetary unions blossom today and,
if political disturbances are discounted, the German monetary union must be said
to have survived, as well.
3 6. In Switzerland, in the first half of the 19th century, nearly all cantons minted some
own money, even the small one of Zug with 15, 000 inhabitants
2 . Moreover, many
coins from other countries circulated inside the Confederation. This situation was
ended with the Bundesverfassung of 1848 which gave to the Confederation, among
other competences, all rights concerning the issue of money.
3 The cantons, on the
other hand, lost those rights. A law of 1850 established a single currency which was,
as will be remembered, closely linked to the French monetary system.
Italy, having consisted of a number of small countries, had had several different sys-
tems of money, too. With the political unification, in 1859/60, most of the states
were annexed to Sardinia. The monetary system was unified in the same way as was
the political system. By a law of August 24, 1862 the monetary system of Sardinia
was extended to the whole of Italy.
4 The former states having lost their political
identity lost at the same time their coinage rights.
5
The German monetary union has a somewhat longer history. The monetary confusion,
existing as in Switzerland and Italy, was cured in two steps. At first, in the Dresden
Convention of 1838, two new unified systems were created: a northern one based on
the thaler and a southern one based on the guilder, both systems being connected by
a fixed exchange rate 14 : 24 1/2.
 6
After the political unification of Germany had taken place the monetary system was
unified, too. In the constitution of 1871
7 ist was laid down that the Reich became
competent in monetary matters, the states losing their rights. As Switzerland, and
unlike Italy, Germany choose to create a new currency, and not to extend the vali-
dity of the Prussian thaler.
8
37. In the light of our previous arguments the successes of the Italian, Swiss, and German
monetary unions are rather disappointing. Economic harmony in Italy was certainly
inferior to that of Scandinavia. Perhaps this was true even of Germany. Nevertheless,
monetary integration succeeded in Italy and in Germany, but not in Scandinavia.
1 The Austro-German Monetary Union was concluded in 1857 between the member states
of the Zollverein and the Austrian Empire. Its main purpose was to establish a rate of
exchange between the thaler, the guilder of South Germany and the Austrian guilder,
and to regulate the intercirculation of money. Already in 1867 the Austro-German Union
was dissolved. It may suffice here to simply present the Austro-German Union as a fail-
ure, which it was. The experience made with this union does not contradict the above
line of argument but rather strengthens it. For information see A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit.,
p. 38 et seq.
2 The example is cited in A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 178.
3 Art. 36 of the Swiss Constitution.
4 Sardinia
1 s monetary system was, as pointed out, similar to that of France.
5 For details see A.E. JANSSEN, op. cit., p. 183 et seq. ; H.P. WILLIS, op. cit.,
p. 36 et seq.
6 Cf. W.O. HENDERSON, op. cit., p. 138 et seq.
7 Equally in the Constitution of the North German Confederation.
8 For details of the German monetary unification see especially O. VEIT, op. cit. , p. 447
et seq.11
There is only one basic difference which can explain this phenomenon. In Scandina-
via, economic policy may well have been conducted in harmony with the other Nor-
dic countries, but there was no unity.
1 The other cases were cases of political uni-
fication, the economic conditions notwithstanding. Monetary union was possibly re-
garded as a (necessary) correlate to political union, but it certainly had no priority
among the aims to be realized during the unification process. Once realized, how-
ever, monetary union in this context meant the centralization of all decisions which
had to do with the monetary system. This fact should be noted, for it seems to have
been of vital importance for the success of the Swiss, Italian, and German monetary
unions.
38. The evidence so far available may be regarded as meagre. From the historical ex-
periences we must, nevertheless, draw the conclusion: As long as the European
Economic Community is concerned with economic harmonization but does not bring
about economic and political unification, a monetary union should be regarded with
suspicion. Experiments with bi-metallism may not recur. But the circulating of
money from different sources with fixed courses has equally proved the value of
Gresham
1 s law. Issuing an EEC-currency under similar circumstances will proba-
bly provide another case in point.
Without harmonization of economic policy there is almost no chance for a monetary
union to succeed. If such an harmonization is assured, some hope may exist. It
could be that the EEC is more efficient in dealing with external disturbances than
was the Scandinavian Monetary Union.
Nevertheless, no monetary union is on record which has survived without unifica-
tion. A minimum requirement seems to be some form of centralized decision-
making process in monetary matters. Political unification probably is necessary,
too. It was, at any rate. And never has a monetary union brought about economic
and political union. That makes it very doubtful whether, in the EEC, monetary
union could act as a "motor" for a broader unification. In the historical cases it
has always been the other way round.
The fact that the king of Sweden wore the Norwegian crown until 1905 does not rep-
resent political unity. This was stressed by the Norwegian parliament when it
accepted the Scandinavian Monetary Union two years later than the Swedish and Danish
parliaments did.